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 Dr. Seuss’s Horton Hears a Who!1 has long been viewed as a parable of human 
equality and dignity. Published in 1954, the same year as the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
landmark anti-discrimination decision in Brown v. Board of Education,2 Horton’s 
famous refrain, “A person’s a person, no matter how small,” elegantly ref lects the 
egalitarian principles espoused by the American civil rights movement. Theodor 
Seuss Geisel, the creator and alter ego of Dr. Seuss, had long opposed racial 
discrimination in the United States3 and wrote Horton, according to biographer 
Donald Pease,4 to “atone” for the xenophobic character of his World War II political 
cartoons.5 Horton the elephant has since become a popular symbol of tolerance, 
equality, and human dignity.6 Even more importantly, Horton’s young readers have, 
for generations, taken from this lovable elephant a greater empathy for those who 
may be different than themselves.
 But unlike later Seuss classics that convey similar messages of racial tolerance 
(e.g., Green Eggs and Ham7 and The Sneetches8), beneath its characteristically childlike 
facade, Horton raises a cascade of complex issues that challenge conventional notions 
1. Dr. Seuss, Horton Hears a Who! (1954). Horton was adapted as a half-hour animated television 
special in 1970, which was produced by Theodor Seuss Geisel. Geisel was not involved in the subsequent 
2008 feature-length animated film distributed by 20th Century Fox.
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Donald E. Pease, Theodor SEUSS Geisel 65–66 (2010).
4. Professor Pease has also contributed an essay to this Law Review issue. See Donald E. Pease, Dr. Seuss’s 
(Un)Civil Imaginaries, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 509 (2013–2014).
5. Pease, supra note 3, at 92–93. 
6. There is a large body of literature that invokes Horton as a touchstone for such qualities. See, e.g., 
Jonathan Todres & Sarah Higinbotham, A Person’s a Person: Children’s Rights in Children’s Literature, 45 
Colum. Hum. Rts L. Rev. 1 (2013) (discussing children’s rights); Tanya Jeffcoat, From There to Here, 
from Here to There, Diversity Is Everywhere, in Dr. Seuss and Philosophy: Oh, the Thinks You Can 
Think! 93, 99–100 (Jacob M. Held ed., 2011) (explaining notions of societal diversity); Dean A. 
Kowalski, Horton Hears You, Too! Seuss and Kant on Respecting Persons, in Dr. Seuss and Philosophy: 
Oh, the Thinks You Can Think!, supra, at 126 (describing Horton as a Kantian moral actor); Angela 
D. West, Horton the Elephant Is a Criminal: Using Dr. Seuss to Teach Social Process, Conflict, and Labeling 
Theory, 16 J. Crim. Just. Educ. 340, 345 (2005) (noting Horton’s widespread perception as a “cautionary 
tale against racial prejudice and discrimination”); Peter M. Cicchino, Defending Humanity, 9 Am. U. J. 
Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 1, 2 (2001) (noting that Horton ref lects “the unique, the profound, the 
unavoidable moral and political consequences that f low from the recognition that the other whose 
presence we share is a person”).
7. Dr. Seuss, Green Eggs and Ham (1960) (imparting the lesson that color does not matter when it 
comes to ham and eggs); see also Pease, supra note 3, at 124 (discussing how Green Eggs evidences “the 
deep social bond concealed beneath socially entrenched antagonisms”).
8. Dr. Seuss, The Sneetches, in The Sneetches and Other Stories (1961) (showing the disastrous 
consequences of racial discrimination to Sneetch society, which is sharply divided between those who bear 
stars on their bellies and those who do not); see also Pease, supra note 3, at 120 (“The Sneetches remain 
trapped in a destructive social order until they arrive at a shared recognition: their need for a social order 
grounded in exclusionary oppositions victimizes both the Sneetches with and the Sneetches without stars.”).
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of property, autonomy, and state action.9 In this essay, I explore the property-based 
undercurrents that run throughout Horton, from Horton the elephant’s initial claim to 
the speck on which Who-ville resides, to the struggle for possession between Horton 
and the jungle “state” ruled by the kangaroo, to the unsettling conclusion in which 
Who-ville is taken under the state’s protective arm. These undercurrents offer insight 
into the mid-twentieth-century American society in which Geisel lived and wrote, a 
society in which attitudes toward private property, capitalism, and government still 
basked in the rosy afterglow of Allied victory in World War II.
 Finding Property in Horton
 It is axiomatic under the common law that a finder of lost property is entitled to 
keep it, and that he thereby obtains good title as against everyone in the world save for 
the original owner.10 This point is illustrated in the frequently taught eighteenth-
century case Armory v. Delamerie,11 in which the Court of the King’s Bench permits a 
poor chimneysweep to recover the value of a found jewel from the most famous 
silversmith in England. How did this rule arise? Through the application of the even 
more ancient notion that possession of a thing gives the possessor certain rights in that 
thing: rights that are superior to the rights of those who do not possess it.12 Hence, in 
the canonical case Pierson v. Post,13 the person who leaps out of the brush and kills a fox 
becomes the owner of the carcass, notwithstanding the fact that a pack of hunters and 
hounds spent the greater part of the morning driving the fox into the killer’s hands. 
Possession, and in the case of Pierson, ultimate possession, is the key to ownership.
 So, too, does Horton the elephant make his claim to a wayward speck of dust. To 
paraphrase the narrative, Horton, while bathing in the jungle, hears a faint cry 
emerge from a passing speck of dust. He hears it only by virtue of his large and 
sensitive elephantine ears. The speck, of course, turns out to be the home of a tiny 
civilization, Who-ville, which is populated by a diverse array of humanoid creatures 
called Whos. From all outward appearances, Horton is motivated to take possession 
of the speck through a combination of curiosity and altruism. He responds to the 
barely audible yelp, which appears to be a cry for help, as the speck f loats precariously 
close to the pond in which Horton is bathing. To ensure its safety, Horton secures 
the speck atop a clover f lower and then delights in becoming acquainted with the 
9. Horton is not the only Dr. Seuss story that raises issues of property and ownership. See, e.g., Aaron J. 
Skoble, Thidwick the Big-Hearted Bearer of Property Rights, in Dr. Seuss and Philosophy: Oh, the 
Thinks You Can Think!, supra note 6, at 159.
10. See generally R.H. Helmholz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1221 (1986).
11. (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.). 
12. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 74 (1985) (“For the 
common law, possession or ‘occupancy’ is the origin of property.”).
13. 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 217 
(Little, Brown, & Co. 1881) (discussing Pierson and related cases concerning possession). 
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tiny residents of Who-ville. But within a few pages of this felicitous encounter, a 
subtle transformation begins to color Horton’s relationship with Who-ville.
 Horton as Possessor
 Soon after Horton comes into possession of the speck on which Who-ville is 
situated, he begins to refer to the speck, the clover, and the Whos as his own.
“What terrible splashing!” the elephant frowned.
“I can’t let my very small persons get drowned!”14
 Horton refers to the Whos as “my” persons. He does so with seemingly altruistic, 
protective intentions, but colored by a sense of possession and hence of ownership. 
This possessory linguistic formulation occurs not just once, but multiple times, 
especially as others attempt to wrest possession of the speck away from Horton.15 
Thus, when the sour kangaroo and her joey16 jump into the pool creating a splash 
and endangering the Whos, Horton hustles his clover and speck away.
 In Horton’s view, the kangaroo is not simply endangering other inhabitants of 
the forest; she is endangering something that Horton owns. As one scholar has 
theorized, the ownership of property contributes to one’s conception of self and sense 
of personhood.17 Horton, very soon after encountering the Whos, seems to assimilate 
their identity into his own, to feel that they and the dust speck on which they reside 
constitute an integral part of him. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. presages this sentiment 
in The Common Law, writing, “Possession is to be protected because a man by taking 
possession of an object has brought it within the sphere of his will. He has extended 
his personality into or over that object.”18 Such is certainly the case with respect to 
Horton and his speck of dust.
 But let us consider in slightly more detail what, precisely, Horton owns when he 
takes possession of that wayward speck of dust. According to the ancient maxim 
cuius est solum, ejus est usque ad caelum et ad inferos (the rights of the surface landowner 
extend upward to the heavens and downward to the center of the earth),19 the owner 
14. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
15. As Richard Chused, Professor of Law at New York Law School, pointed out to me in a dinner conversation 
preceding the symposium on February 28, 2013, the first person possessive “my” is also commonly used to 
express kinship (e.g., my mother, my children) and group association (“let my people go”). Despite the fact 
that Horton the elephant shares no kinship or group identity with the Whos, he may, in fact, use the 
possessive “my” as a reflection of his feelings of (parental) kinship toward the Whos. But even if such were 
the case, notwithstanding Horton’s gross biological misunderstanding, this justification would not in any 
event apply to the speck or the clover, to which Horton also refers as his own.
16. A “joey” is a baby kangaroo.
17. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 959 (1982) (“Most people possess 
certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves. These objects are closely bound up with 
personhood because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in 
the world.”).
18. Holmes, supra note 13, at 207 (basing his reasoning on the work of Kant and Hegel).
19. Black’s Law Dictionary 341 (5th ed. 1979); see also, Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1929).
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of a parcel of land owns everything above and below it. This notion originated in 
Roman law and has been handed down today in only slightly modified form.20 It is 
for this reason that a landowner can claim title to the minerals that lie below the 
surface, to the waterfowl that f ly above it, and to the trees that grow upon it.21 And 
not only to the trees, but to their trunks, their branches, every pinecone and leaf, 
every insect that crawls upon each leaf, and every atom of every such insect. All are 
owned by the owner of the land.22
 So, too, it would go with Who-ville. Horton takes possession of the speck and all 
that resides upon it no matter how improbably small: its buildings, its streets, its 
outlandish instruments and vehicles. But what about its inhabitants?
 Owning Whos?
 The disturbing notion of persons23 as property is not a new one, finding its roots 
in laws as ancient as writing itself. Every ancient civilization enslaved persons against 
their will: enemies captured in battle, convicted criminals, and the populations of 
vanquished territories.24 In feudal Europe, landowners held nearly absolute dominion 
over the serfs populating their lands, requiring them to work the fields and perform 
other labor under conditions that were akin to enslavement.25 In Russia, this system 
20. See Holmes, supra note 13, at 209 (discussing Roman law antecedents to common law property rules 
regarding possession).
21. See John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 979 (2008).
22. This principle is known as the doctrine of “accession,” in which “the granting of title to some resource is 
based on its relationship to something that is already owned.” Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent 
Infringement Remedies, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 175, 195 (2011). For this reason, every landowner has an 
exclusive common law right to kill or capture game on his or her own land, subject to state regulation. See, 
e.g., McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127 (1922); Hanson v. Fergus Falls Nat’l Bank, 65 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 
1954); see also State v. Taylor, 214 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. 1948) (stating that in private waters subject to state 
regulation, the owner of the soil beneath the waters retains the exclusive right to fish, hunt, or trap 
animals). “For Blackstone, there were two forms of occupancy entitling the occupant to acquisition of 
property; firstly, and with particular reference to game, the occupier of land would have title to animals on 
his land by virtue of the land (ratione soli) or by virtue of some privileged position or grant from a superior 
granting body (ratione privilegi); secondly, there was the occupancy of a first finder.” Peter Cook, The 
“Prerogative Property” Basis of the English Game Law System, in Property and Protection: Legal 
Rights and Restrictions 124–25 (Brian W. Harvey et al. eds., 2000) (emphasis added).
23. Although the characters in Horton are not human, per se, they are anthropomorphized to such a degree 
that their characters are clearly more akin to humans than animals. I will thus treat them, for purposes 
of this essay, as human. The distinction is important, as animals have always been viewed as chattels 
under the common law and, for the most part, still are, whereas humans have not been viewed as 
property in the United States since the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century.
24. See, e.g., Niall McKeown, Greek and Roman Slavery, in The Routledge History of Slavery 19 (Gad 
Heuman & Trevor Burnard eds., 2011).
25. See John G. Sprankling, Understanding Property Law § 15.04[A] (3rd ed. 2012) (“In the early 
feudal era, the lands of the nobility and gentry were cultivated by landless serfs under customary 
arrangements that differed little from slavery.”).
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persisted into the early twentieth century.26 And even in the United States, through 
the middle of the twentieth century owners of “company towns” exerted significant 
control over the lives of their worker-inhabitants and their families, even to the 
extent of depriving them of basic rights.27 In all of these cases, dominion over 
property gave rise to significant rights over, if not outright ownership of, persons.
 But control of human property did not arise solely in connection with the 
acquisition of territory. Sometimes it came with possession of things, such as vessels. 
Consider the case of La Amistad, the infamous Spanish slave ship whose imprisoned 
passengers mutinied off the coast of Cuba in 1839.28 After seizing control of the vessel, 
the mutineers demanded that they be returned to Sierra Leone, their homeland. But 
the two Spanish officers who survived deceived the mutineers and piloted La Amistad 
north, eventually making landfall on Long Island. There, while reprovisioning, the 
mutineers were apprehended by the crew of a U.S. naval vessel, the Washington. The 
Africans were taken into custody and tried. The ensuing legal proceedings were long 
and complex, involving both charges of mutiny and an action by the Spaniards to 
reclaim their lost human “cargo.”29 In addition, the crew of the Washington argued 
that La Amistad and the slaves should be treated under the international law of salvage 
and thereby awarded to the Americans. That is, under salvage law, recovery of an 
abandoned ship entitles the finder to its entire contents. While most shipwreck and 
salvage cases involved claims over gold bullion and silver plate, the most valuable 
contents of La Amistad were fifty-three living persons. Had the crew’s salvage claim 
been successful,30 ownership of those persons would have followed ownership of the 
vessel, to which the American crew of the Washington laid claim.
 Consider in this light the microscopic passengers on Horton’s speck of dust, which 
he describes as “my very small persons.” Does the elephant’s possessory intuition 
regarding the Whos flow from his hard-won possession of the speck that they inhabit?
26. See Gregory L. Freeze, Reform and Counter Reform 1855–1890, in Russia: A History 199 (Gregory L. 
Freeze ed., 2009).
27. See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (concluding that by the late twentieth century, an owner of 
a camp for migrant workers was not entitled to prevent visits by health care workers).
28. The slaves, captured somewhere in western Africa, had recently been transported to Cuba aboard a 
Portuguese vessel. They were then being transported on La Amistad from Havana to the port of Guanaja 
in central Cuba, where they would be sold to owners of the booming sugar plantations there. Markus 
Rediker, The Amistad Rebellion: An Atlantic Odyssey of Slavery and Freedom 1–2 (2012); 
see also Roger S. Clark, Steven Spielberg’s Amistad and Other Things I Have Thought About in the Past 
Forty Years: International (Criminal) Law, Conflict of Laws, Insurance and Slavery, 30 Rutgers L.J. 371, 
383–400 (1999).
29. The African mutineers, represented in the Supreme Court by then-Congressman, and former President, 
John Quincy Adams, were ultimately exonerated. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Story, 
held that the Africans had been kidnapped in violation of Spanish treaty obligations and were therefore 
not slaves. United States v. Libellants & Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841); see also 
Rediker, supra note 28, at 190.
30. See Howard Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad: The Saga of a Slave Revolt and its Impact on 
American Abolition, Law, and Diplomacy 101–02 (1987) (describing details of the salvage claims); 
Clark, supra note 28, at 386 n.43 (noting that the salvage claim for the Africans failed, as they were held 
to no longer be slaves, but succeeded as to the ship and its other cargo).
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 Dispossession and Repossession
 Theft, of course, is a risk faced by all owners of property; and both the common 
law and our own sensibilities favor an owner’s recovery of wrongfully taken property. 
It is for this reason that Horton (and we) feel aggrieved when the Wickersham 
Brothers31 seize the speck-bearing clover from Horton’s trunk, and even more so 
when the black-bottomed eagle Vlad Vlad-i-koff carries it away.32 Here, the reader, 
or the young listener, becomes complicit in Horton’s ownership claim. Horton is no 
longer the subjugator of a once-autonomous people, but a victim of simple property 
theft. And again, the language of ownership, and dispossession, is manifest in the 
text: “They snatched Horton’s clover! They carried it off ” and Horton’s ensuing plea 
to Vlad-i-koff, “Please don’t harm all my little folks . . . .”33
 It is at this point in the narrative that the great transformation in Horton occurs. 
Vlad-i-koff drops the clover bearing Who-ville into a vast field of clover one hundred 
miles wide. He doesn’t destroy it, he doesn’t drown it or burn it, he simply makes it 
hard to find. And Horton vows to get it back.
“I’ll find it!” cried Horton, “I’ll find it or bust!
I SHALL find my friends on my small speck of dust!”34
 Why, the reader asks, does Horton pick through three million clovers until he 
finds the one bearing “his” speck of dust? Is Horton simply lonely, wishing to be 
reunited with his small friends? If so, he does not express this sentiment. Is Horton 
motivated by a sense of altruism and concern for the well-being of the Whos? If so, 
then surely he could have left them safely among the clover, where they would have 
remained hidden from unfriendly monkeys, eagles, kangaroos, and whatever other 
jungle denizens wished them ill.
 But Horton doesn’t let them be. He doesn’t allow the Whos to live safely in the 
camouf laged anonymity afforded by three million identical clovers. Instead he 
undertakes a Herculean effort to find and retrieve his clover, his speck, his people. 
Why? Because, of course, the speck belongs to Horton. It is his speck and he wants it 
back, no matter the consequences. Horton expresses the common refrain of property 
owners young and old, a sentiment that would be universally understood by even the 
31. These vaguely sinister monkeys appear to be named after President Herbert Hoover’s Wickersham 
Commission, which was established in 1929 to investigate instances of “lawlessness in law enforcement,” 
including illegal arrests, bribery, entrapment, witness coercion, abusive interrogations, evidence 
fabrication, wiretapping, and police brutality. See West, supra note 6, at 353–54. Seuss’s use of the name 
is ironic, as in Horton it is the Wickersham Brothers who are the instruments of the kangaroo’s corrupt 
state, rather than its prosecutors. It is also interesting to note that the Wickersham Commission 
recommended the continuation of Prohibition in the United States, a law that devastated young Theodor 
Geisel’s immigrant family, which operated a brewery in Springfield, Massachusetts. See id.; see also 
Pease, supra note 3, at 16.
32. As Professor Radin explains, the loss of a possession (such as a wedding ring) that is bound up with the 
owner’s sense of personhood is typically viewed as non-compensable. Radin, supra note 17, at 159.
33. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
34. Id. (emphasis added).
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smallest reader of Horton: it’s mine, give it back! And, as we know, Horton does find 
his speck, and the Whos, once again.
 The Condemnation of Who-ville
 But then the trouble really begins, as Horton and the Whos come face to face 
with the authority of the state, represented by the sour kangaroo. Shortly after 
Horton’s recovery of his speck from the hundred-mile clover patch, the kangaroo 
again dispatches the Wickershams. They forcibly restrain Horton, seize the speck, 
and prepare to boil it in Beezle-Nut oil. As such, the kangaroo wields the traditional 
“police” power of the state to divest its citizens of their property and to condemn that 
property to destruction to preserve public health, safety, and welfare.
 The taking of property for a public purpose, or eminent domain, is among the oldest 
prerogatives of the state and is said to have its origins in Roman law.35 The power of 
eminent domain has been recognized under U.S. law since the earliest days, and is 
exemplified by the Supreme Court’s 1879 decision in Bowditch v. Boston, affirming the 
city’s unqualified right to dynamite a private citizen’s warehouse, destroying it and its 
contents, in order to stop the spread of fire.36 Since Bowditch, the eminent domain power 
of the state has been expanded to permit the condemnation of private property for public 
purposes, broadly defined. These purposes encompass the elimination of urban blight,37 
the facilitation of economic development,38 the de-concentration of land ownership,39 
and the containment of harmful agricultural pathogens.40
 In the kangaroo’s jungle state, the public interest at stake is preservation of the 
peace. As she explains,
For almost two days you’ve run wild and insisted
On chatting with persons who’ve never existed.
Such carryings-on in our peaceable jungle!
We’ve had quite enough of your bellowing bungle!41
35. See generally Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 1061–62 (7th ed. 2010) (discussing the origins of the 
state’s eminent domain power).
36. 101 U.S. 16 (1879) (holding that no compensation was due to the plaintiff on account of the city’s 
destruction of his warehouse when effected to address a fire emergency).
37. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (justifying the demolition of a non-blighted block in an otherwise 
run-down area of Washington, D.C. on the theory that “[i]f [Congress] decides that the Nation’s Capital 
shall be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way”).
38. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (authorizing the condemnation of fifteen private 
residences under a city redevelopment plan that would have transferred the condemned property to Pfizer).
39. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding the constitutionality of the Hawaii 
Land Reform Act of 1967, which allowed renters to acquire fee simple ownership of their rental property 
in order to break up the “oligopsonistic” character of Hawaiian land ownership).
40. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding a Virginia statute requiring the destruction, without 
compensation, of cedar trees infected by a plant disease to prevent its communication to Virginia’s 
commercially valuable apple trees).
41. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 1.
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 In the kangaroo’s view, Horton suffers from a delusion that sentient beings exist on 
a speck of dust. This eccentric behavior has, not surprisingly, created a stir within the 
jungle community, and she seeks to restore order by eliminating the source of Horton’s 
delusion. Thus, while the kangaroo is often depicted as a villain eager to inflict grievous 
harm on Who-ville, in actuality she acts with two legitimate governmental purposes: 
(1) curing a diagnosed mental delusion in one of its citizens (Horton) and (2) restoring 
order to the community.42 While Who-ville will be annihilated if her plan is carried 
out, she is, at the time, unaware that Who-ville actually exists (and, truth be told, 
acting pretty rationally in her disbelief of Horton’s claim).
 So the speck is seized and condemned by the state, this time slated for permanent 
destruction. Who-ville may thus join Detroit’s Poletown,43 Washington, D.C.’s “Area 
B,”44 the block containing Suzy Kelo’s house in New London, Connecticut,45 and a 
long list of other neighborhoods that have fallen to state-sanctioned wrecking balls 
in the name of urban renewal, economic development, and other public purposes.46
 Recovery and Protection(ism)
 But, of course, Horton does not end tragically. The Whos manage to overcome 
their collective action problem47 and make enough noise to be heard by the kangaroo 
and her minions, who then willingly abandon their plan of destruction. They do so 
because they receive faint but audible confirmation of the Whos’ existence, and thus 
42. At this point in the narrative Dr. Seuss does appear to depict the kangaroo as a villain, both in her visual 
rendition and in the narrative. See id.
43. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (condemning a 
neighborhood to make room for a General Motors plant).
44. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman 
v. Parker, 42 Urb. Law. 423 (2010).
45. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
46. Of course, under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, most takings of private property must 
be compensated. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes Taking of Property Requiring 
Compensation Under Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution—Supreme Court 
Cases, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 231 (2014).
47. The classic collective action problem was described by economist and social scientist Mancur Olson in 
1965:
If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they 
will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to 
force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of 
the common or group interest, is offered to members of the group individually on the 
condition that they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of the 
group objectives. . . . These points hold true even when there is unanimous agreement 
in a group about the common good and the methods of achieving it.
 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 2 
(2d ed. 1971). In effect, Olson’s insight is that individuals will not act to achieve a common goal unless 
they have individual incentives to do so, the achievement of the common good being insufficient to motivate 
their action. This problem confronts the Mayor of Who-ville as he attempts to persuade young Jo-Jo to 
add his voice to the accumulated clamor and commotion generated by the rest of the citizens of Who-ville.
612
NO MATTER HOW SMALL… PROPERTY, AUTONOMY, AND STATE IN HORTON HEARS A WHO! NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 58 | 2013/14
Horton’s sanity. It is no longer necessary to eliminate Horton’s speck to preserve the 
peace.
 But Horton’s denouement surprises the reader yet again. At this point, with the 
Whos recognized as real and not mere figments of Horton’s imagination, the 
kangaroo might simply have returned the speck to Horton, or better yet released it 
back into the wild. But instead, the kangaroo issues a perplexing edict:
And, from now on, you know what I’m planning to do?...
From now on, I’m going to protect them with you!48
 She declares that she will “protect” the speck and its inhabitants, dedicating the 
authority of the state to the security of the small and helpless Whos. It is not enough 
to leave the Whos alone, to let them lead an autonomous and unmolested existence 
in Who-ville. No. Presumably because of their small size and vulnerable nature, the 
Whos warrant the continued protection and oversight of the state. They are thus 
reduced to the status of wards, rather than fully autonomous citizens.
 This move, too, has historical antecedents. One sees it most tellingly in the 
American treatment of native peoples, with the policy first announced by Chief 
Justice John Marshall in the landmark 1823 case Johnson v. M’Intosh.49 In Johnson, 
Marshall declines to recognize native title in the lands of North America, favoring 
instead the title claimed by European explorers three centuries earlier on behalf of 
England, Spain, and other Christian powers. He justifies this apparent seizure of 
property in part on the basis of the “character and habits” of the native inhabitants, 
whom he calls “fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was 
drawn chiefly from the forest.”50 People such as this, he reasons, have no business 
owning or disposing of valuable territory that could be put to more productive use by 
settlers of European descent.
 Once divesting them of their title to the land, Marshall makes another notable 
move regarding the Native Americans. Rather than treating them as ordinary 
citizens of the young republic, he relegates them to a diminished status, like wards of 
the state. “[T]he Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be 
protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed 
incapable of transferring the absolute title to others.”51 This view of the Native 
Americans as incompetent and in need of protection gave rise to the so-called “trust 
doctrine” in federal Indian law, under which tribal lands are held by the state in trust 
for the native occupants.52 As confirmed by the Court more than sixty years after 
Johnson, “[t]hese Indian tribes are wards of the nation. . . . From their very weakness 
48. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
49. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
50. Id. at 589–90.
51. Id. at 591 (emphasis added).
52. See Blake A. Watson, Buying America from the Indians: Johnson v. McIntosh and the 
History of Native Land Rights 334–36 (2012).
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and helplessness . . . there arises the duty of protection.”53 And, as a necessary 
corollary to the state’s obligation to protect, comes the ward’s duty to obey, as a child 
or other incompetent must comply with the decisions of his or her guardians. To this 
end, the Court observes in 1917 that with respect to the Native Americans, the 
“wish of the ward [must] yield to the will of the guardian.”54
 It has been noted by innumerable commentators that the U.S. government’s 
treatment of the country’s native inhabitants was shameful, notwithstanding efforts 
to couch its actions in the rhetoric of legal process. Few have observed this trend 
with greater alacrity than the young French nobleman Alexis de Tocqueville, who 
visited the United States from 1831 to 1832 and published his observations in the 
seminal work Democracy in America. Just a few years after Marshall’s opinion in 
Johnson, de Tocqueville writes:
The Spaniards were unable to exterminate the Indian race by those 
unparalleled atrocities which brand them with indelible shame, nor did they 
even succeed in wholly depriving it of its rights; but the Americans of the 
United States have accomplished this twofold purpose with singular felicity; 
tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood, and without 
violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of the world. It is 
impossible to destroy men with more respect for the laws of humanity.55
 So, despite the seemingly happy ending of Horton, one must consider the 
implications for Who-ville of the state’s “protective” stance. As the U.S. government’s 
treatment of its native peoples suggests, dominant societies have not always done well 
when extending their protection to servient ones. The rhetoric of “protection” has, in 
fact, been used throughout history to justify a wide range of oppressive governmental 
regimes. And while there is no indication that the kangaroo’s jungle regime will treat 
Who-ville with anything other than kindness,56 the same regime clearly demonstrated 
its willingness to resort to brutal strong-arm tactics only a few pages earlier. Thus, the 
Whos might wish to carefully consider their newfound protectors.
 Deconstructing Horton
 There is an old adage that observes, “If all you have is a hammer, everything 
looks like a nail.”57 I teach property law, and I readily admit to seeing (imagining?) 
53. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886).
54. United States v. Rowell, 23 U.S. 464, 468 (1917), quoted in Watson, supra note 52, at 336.
55. 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 353 (Henry Reeve trans., 3d Am. ed. 1898).
56. It is a tribute to Seuss’s artistry that his graphical depictions of the kangaroo, monkeys, and other jungle 
denizens is so radically transformed over the course of a few pages: from depraved and sinister glee as 
they prepare the pot of boiling oil, to childlike wonderment as they hear the cry of the Whos, to regal 
magnanimity as the kangaroo and her joey extend a protective umbrella over Horton’s speck of dust. See 
Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 1.
57. This adage has been called “Baruch’s Observation,” after Bernard Baruch, who may or may not have 
originated it. Arthur Bloch, The Complete Murphy’s Law: A Definitive Collection (1991).
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traces of property law in places where others might not.58 My goal in this essay is not 
to argue that the property-based concepts described above are explicit messages 
intended by the author to be read into Horton. Nor am I suggesting that Theodor 
Geisel intended Horton to be a pro-property, pro-government, or, Heaven forbid, a 
pro-slavery tract. Of course not. One must not lose sight of the fact that Horton is a 
parable of equality and otherness, and its longstanding reputation as such is well 
deserved.59 What I do contend, however, is that Horton offers valuable insights into 
mid-twentieth-century attitudes about ownership, autonomy, and the state; attitudes 
that stem, in large part, from prevailing legal rules governing property.
 Horton the elephant does not think of the Whos as his own because he is greedy, 
because he wishes to exert his will over them, or because he has delusions of grandeur. 
Those who read Horton as being motivated by altruism, friendship, and even love 
are not without solid grounding in the text. However, the notions of ownership 
outlined in this essay are also present, albeit below the surface. They are present, I 
believe, because notions of private property and the value of ownership are deeply 
ingrained in the social fabric of the United States. They have long been viewed as an 
integral part of the American legal framework,60 and as fundamental characteristics 
of an American society that was vastly superior, morally and economically, to the 
collectivist ideology of Bolshevik Russia and Maoist China.61 Theodor Geisel, the 
son of German immigrants and business owners, undoubtedly shared this American 
respect for private property, and it is not surprising that this sentiment found its way 
into works such as Horton.62 And while the salvage claim made in the La Amistad 
case would be unthinkable today, how far removed are Horton’s assumptions 
regarding the Whos from those of the owners of company towns that f lourished in 
mid-twentieth-century America?
 Likewise, the idea of a protective, paternalistic state could not have been far from 
the minds of many Americans, least of all Geisel’s, in the decade after World War II. 
Post-war America was steeped in patriotism, and the image of the (American) state 
as a protector of liberty and freedom was prevalent throughout the nation. It should 
58. Cf. Eric R. Claeys, On Cowbells in Rock Anthems (and Property in IP): A Review of Justifying Intellectual 
Property, 49 San Diego L. Rev. 1033, 1033–34 (2012) (“When he heard (Don’t Fear) The Reaper, 
Bruce Dickinson had to have more cowbell; when I read IP scholarship, I gotta have more property.”).
59. See supra note 6.
60. See, e.g., Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & 
Econ. 467 (1976) (describing the predominance of property-based concepts on the thinking of Thomas 
Jefferson); William H. Taft, The Right of Private Property, 3 Mich. L.J. 215, 215 (1894) (“As far back as 
we can go in the history of the common law of England, the right of property of the freeman was 
theoretically inviolate.”).
61. See, e.g., Richard Pipes, Human Nature and the Fall of Communism, 49 Am. Acad. Arts & Sci. Bull. 
38, 38 (1996) (arguing that the abolition of private property was a primary cause of the decline of the 
Soviet Union); Taft, supra note 60, at 218 (characterizing laws guaranteeing private property as 
buttresses against the “attacks of anarchy, socialism and communism”).
62. Geisel’s family owned a prosperous brewing company in Springfield, Illinois during most of his 
childhood. The family’s business was ruined by the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and the 
introduction of Prohibition in 1919, when Geisel was fifteen. Pease, supra note 3, at 16.
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not be forgotten that Geisel conceived Horton during a 1950 trip to Japan, a devastated 
country that was still under occupation by U.S. and other Allied forces.63 Geisel 
acknowledged the inf luence of his observations in Japan on themes appearing in 
Horton, notably the book’s validation of individuality and self-worth (attributes that 
he found lacking among the post-war Japanese).64 It would not be surprising, 
therefore, if other, less superficial manifestations of Geisel’s Japanese visit found 
their way into Horton. For example, the need (or obligation) for powerful states to 
protect lesser, subjugated states, is sensitively depicted by the joey’s extension of a 
small umbrella to shield Who-ville from the elements.65
 The image of the state as a benevolent protector of its wards still bore currency in 
the era of Horton, though that rosy image would soon disappear amidst the civil 
unrest of the 1960s and the environmental crises of the 1970s. Geisel’s later works, 
most notably The Sneetches (1961),66 do not present a favorable impression of the state 
or societal governance mechanisms. These are instead represented as corrupt and 
ineffective in combating social ills such as inequality and discrimination. Thus, in 
Yertle the Turtle (1958), Seuss depicts an autocratic turtle king whose power rests, 
literally, on the backs of his subjects.67 Finally, in The Lorax (1971), Seuss paints a 
dark picture of a society dominated by corporate greed and a rapacious thirst for 
resources.68 In the depressing world of the Lorax, there is little sense that property 
ownership represents a social good, or that any but soulless despoilers seek to exercise 
their rights over the land and its hapless inhabitants.
 But Horton, written in the less pessimistic post-war years, does not yet condemn 
capitalism and private ownership, and the signs of Geisel’s early favorable disposition 
toward property ownership, property rules, and state protection emerge in the 
narrative. Horton thus offers a view, unsettling and surprising at times, but perhaps 
understandable, of how thoroughly property-based sensibilities permeated the 
thinking of mid-twentieth-century America.
63. See id. at 92–93.
64. Id. at 93.
65. But see Timothy E. Cook, Another Perspective on Political Authority in Children’s Literature: The Fallible 
Leader in L. Frank Baum and Dr. Seuss, 36 W. Pol. Q. 326, 331–32 (1983) (reading Horton as portraying 
a general American “ethic of individual coping, self-reliance and responsibility for one’s own destiny[,]” 
particularly as exemplified by the salvation of Who-ville through the efforts of “the Smallest of All”). 
66. The Sneetches, supra note 8.
67. Dr. Seuss, Yertle the Turtle, in Yertle the Turtle and Other Stories (1958). King Yertle is 
commonly viewed as an allegory of Hitler’s autocratic state. See Pease, supra note 3, at 118.
68. Dr. Seuss, The Lorax (1971).
